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ABSTRACT
The separation of ownership from control in large corporations can cause agency
problems. This study analyzes the effects of the dispersion of corporate ownership on the
compensation of the top executives of Fortune 500 companies. We estimate the effects across
the executive hierarchy and for different components of the compensation package in contrast
to more limited previous studies. The results indicate that there is a significant agency effect
on executive pay, though the magnitude is small relative to company size. The effects are
greatest for the most liquid form of remuneration, salaries, and are nonuniform across executive
categories, with the strongest effect found for the Chairman of the Board.
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Executive Compensation and Agency Effects
Agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control in large corporations
have been the subject of extensive concern since first popularized by Berle and Means (1932).
Further research efforts have been stimulated by the more recent formulation of the agency
problem by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The problem may manifest itself in the compensation
of top executives of corporations where management and ownership are separate. The public
is fascinated by the multi-million dollar remuneration figures featured in the press, while
academics steeped in neoclassical models of factor price determination wonder whether such
compensation can be reconciled with productivity differentials, or else whether management is
taking advantage of the lack of ownership control. Two bodies of literature have developed
which are related to the latter possibility. The first investigates the relationship between
executive compensation and corporate performance, and the second relates corporate
performance to the degree of control that owners have over managers of the firm. This study
brings together these two lines of research and tests directly the agency issue of the effect of the
dispersion of corporate ownership on the compensation of the executives of Fortune 500
corporations.
Previous studies in this vein have related Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation
to ownership dispersion, implicitly assuming that the CEO is a reasonable proxy for all top
executives. We show, rather, that agency effects are not uniform across executive groups, and
thus it may be misleading to let the CEO represent the whole executive group. By directly
addressing the agency question through an analysis of all top executives, we find that a less
concentrated corporate ownership leads to significantly higher executive compensation, with
differential effects on different positions in the executive hierarchy and for different components
of the compensation package. However, the magnitude of the diversion of resources to the
executive group in a typical corporation in our sample is not large relative to company size. d
first section of the paper reviews the previous literature, develops the ideas tested, and presents
the formal model. The second section describes the data utilized in the study, especially the
ownership dispersion data for 1980 and the executive compensation data. The third section tests
for the agency effects and calculates the importance of the effects. The final section presents
the conclusions of the analysis.
I. The Agency Problem and Executive Compensation
The examination of the modern corporation by Berle and Means (1932) raised various
issues about the operation of corporations, including the implications of the separation of
ownership and management. The general agency problem arises when the manager (the agent)
does not act in the best interest of owners (the principals) of the company. Opportunistic
behavior by managers is hypothesized to increase with a decline in corporate control, which is
measured in this study by the degree of dispersion in stock ownership. A greater dispersion of
ownership leads to greater costs to owners of collecting and disseminating information regarding
the efficiency of managerial decisions, and also to smaller returns to each stockholder for
policing managerial inefficiencies (see DeAlessi, 1973). Dispersion of ownership not only
reduces the incentive of shareholders to monitor managerial actions, but also reduces the ability
of shareholders to remove unsatisfactory managers, thereby creating incentives for managers to
exploit their relatively protected positions.1
It is assumed that managers are utility maximizers, so we might expect that they would
also try to extract gains from lack of ownership control in less easily measured items such as
the size and quality of the executive group and support staff, the character of the work
*An alternative view is offered by Fama (1980). He conjectures that if labor markets operate
efficiently market forces can resolve the incentive problem. Specifically, positions with greater scope
for discretionary behavior will provide less compensation as competition for these positions reduce
the supply price.
environment, and insulation from undue pressure and unpleasant environmental circumstances.2
Consequently, it is more difficult to find a measurable effect on compensation, and finding one
provides strong evidence of an agency effect.
In this paper we examine the measurable aspects of executive remuneration which are
reported according to the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Most
firms divide executive compensation into three categories: salaries, personal benefits, and
contingent remuneration.3 Salaries include directors fees and bonuses, personal benefits include
insurance, securities, auto leasing, and tax and financial advice, while contingent remuneration
items such as stock options depend on company performance. We would expect salaries and
contingent payments to be the most desirable categories through which to extract agency gains
since they represent direct monetary compensation for the executive4. Since reporting of
executive compensation is not totally consistent across companies, total remuneration (INCOME)
may prove to be the most dependable measure of compensation. Nevertheless, the empirical
analysis examines total remuneration and the three separate remuneration categories.
The agency problem may affect the remuneration of different types of executives in
different ways. Though duties and titles vary by company, there are generally three top
positions in large corporations: Chairman of the Board (CB), Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
and President (PRES). The Chairman of the Board runs the Board meetings, the CEO has
overall responsibility for the company, and the President usually is the chief operating officer.
2Unfortunately we do not have systematic data on many of these factors, except for the size of
the entire executive group. In regressions of the number of executives in the firm on ownership
dispersion (results available on request), we found that in more dispersely held companies the
executive group was larger (relative to company size), although the effect was statistically
insignificant.
3In our empirical analysis, categories were combined when firms subdivided any of these main
classifications.
4Although contingent remuneration contains the risk of being tied to company performance, it
may in turn be adversely influenced by opportunistic managerial behavior.
Evaluation of agency and executive compensation is complicated since frequently the same
person holds multiple offices, in particular the Chairman of the Board and the CEO. In a typical
company, the Compensation Committee, which is usually comprised of mostly outside directors,
recommends to the full board the compensation of the CEO, taking into account relative
compensation for CEOs of other companies. However, a powerful CEO may be directly
responsible for membership on the Board and may, in effect, control the Board. Thus, in the
extreme case he could be setting his own compensation. This would be expected to be more
prevalent in companies where ownership was more dispersed and the agency problem was more
important. The Chairman and other members of the Board have their compensation set by the
Board. Lack of ownership concentration might thus also allow for greater compensation for
these individuals.
It is also important to recognize that the CEO recommends to the Board the compensation
package for other top executives, although there is some evidence that there are generally
accepted ratios between CEO compensation and compensation for other top executive positions.5
In our sample, 82% of the CEOs were also Chairmen of the Board. We would expect the
agency relationship to be stronger in this case and in other cases of the same individual holding
multiple top positions. Finding a differential effect of the agency problem on different level
executives would clearly question the validity of the practice of previous researchers of using
CEO remuneration as a proxy for executive remuneration.
When testing the effect of the degree of corporate control on executive remuneration it
is necessary to control for other factors that may affect the level of executive compensation. In
one of the earliest studies, Patton (1952) found, using simple correlation coefficients, that
executive compensation was positively correlated with both profits and firm growth. It is
noteworthy that while Patton examined the distribution of pay among different types of
5Henderson (1982), p. 461.
executives, and also considered various measures of compensation, most succeeding studies have
utilized only CEOs (ostensibly because of the difficulty in compiling more complete data sets).
Roberts (1956) found a stronger relationship between sales and compensation than between
profits and compensation and this was supported by McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1982), but
contradicted by Jensen and Murphy (1990). Ciscel and Carroll (1980) corrected for econometric
problems found in previous work, specifically dealing with the multicollinearity between sales
and profits by using an instrumental variable for profits. We use profit rates instead of profits
(to avoid collinearity problems with company size measures) and have included sales growth as
an explanatory variable. Other factors introduced as explanatory variables have been regulatory
effects in transportation and utilities (Carroll and Ciscel, 1982), market concentration and
barriers to entry (Auerbach and Siegfried, 1974), the gender of executives and capital investment
in workers (Bartlett and Miller, 1986), sales growth (Murphy, 1985; Coughlan and Schmidt,
1985), stock performance instead of accounting performance (Masson, 1971; Murphy, 1985;
Deckop, 1987; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Gibbons and Murphy, 1989), and industry and
stock market performance (Gibbons and Murphy, 1989). Gomez-Mejia, Tosin and Hihkin
(1989) divide their small sample of firms into manager-controlled and owner-controlled samples
to show that CEO compensation is affected more by performance than scale in owner-controlled
firms as compared to manager-controlled firms.
The second line of research relates corporate performance (and valuation) to the
dispersion of ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) considered ownership concentration as a
substitute for alternative measures of controlling management, but using a linear relationship
found no correlation between profit rates and ownership. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)
found a significant nonmonotonic relationship between ownership concentration and profit rates,
and also between ownership concentration and Tobin's Q - a measure of market valuation. In
particular they found that Tobin's Q rises, then falls, and then rises again as ownership
concentration increases. Since the evidence is conflicting regarding the effect of agency
problems on firm performance, further analysis of the determinants of ownership concentration
and changes in ownership concentration, such as that done by Simon (1989), can potentially be
useful.6
Two studies have attempted to directly test the agency problem with respect to executive
compensation. Both, however, only use CEO compensation, excluding all other executives
because of data availability, and additionally aggregate compensation as a single, composite
measure.7 Santerre and Neun (1986) and Dyl (1988) both found a negative relationship between
ownership concentration and CEO compensation, which they claim supports the agency
hypothesis and rejects the hypothesis formulated by Fama (1980) that the competitive labor
market will resolve the agency problem. Dyl explicitly recognizes that he is assuming that CEO
compensation is serving as a proxy for all executive compensation, i.e. that the effects of agency
will be uniform throughout the executive group, while Santerre and Neun do not address the
issue. We show in our empirical work, though, that the CEOs compensation is not an adequate
proxy for executive compensation, namely that agency effects significantly differ across different
executive positions.8
6To the extent that higher executive pay adversely impacts on profitability, simultaneity problems
may arise. Yet, due to the small dollar effect of agency on executive pay (see Table 5), feedback
effects to profits may not cause substantial estimation problems.
7Santerre and Neun (1989) replicates a study by Stigler and Friedland (1983) on the relationship
between stockholder control and executive compensation for a sample of 92 firms for 1937-38. After
adding profit rates as an additional independent variable, they find a negative relationship between
the average salary of the top 3 executives and the percent of the stock held by the top 20
shareholders in contrast to the insignificant relationship found by Stigler and Friedland.
8Santerre and Neun only use 68 firms (excluding all owner-managed firms and those without
market power (under the belief that the former will not exhibit agency effects and the latter will be
sufficiently constrained by the market so as to eliminate opportunistic managerial behavior). While
Dyl uses a larger sample of 271 firms, this study is based on a much larger group of firms (451), and
explicitly analyses the differences in agency effects in owner-managed and manager-controlled firms.
Both previous studies use Forbes Magazine CEO remuneration data and the Corporate Data
Exchange Stock Ownership Directory: Fortune 500 data for ownership dispersion. Santerre and
Neun employ assets, profit rates, and a Herfindahl index of stock dispersion as independent
The basic model used in this paper to test agency effects on executive compensation is
formulated as follows (see appendix Table 1A for exact variable definitions and data sources):
E = f (TOP5, CL, S, P, G, Y, D) (1)
where:
E = various measures of executive compensation,
TOP5 = stock ownership dispersion (percentage of stock held by the top five
stockholders),
CL = dummy variable for owner-managed firms (one of the top five managers
is one of the top five stockholders),
S = size (employment),
P = rate of return to investors,
G = growth of company size (sales),
Y = three dummy variables for type of ownership (corporate,
family, or financial institution),
D = dummy variables for executive positions.
Natural logs are taken for all variables except for dummy variables and variables with
negative values such as profit rates.9 Our central hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient for
the ownership dispersion variable (LT0P5) since more concentrated ownership would act to
reduce the extent of the agency problem as exhibited by higher executive compensation. We
expect a positive coefficient for both the size and profitability variables, since these variables
test the traditional executive compensation hypotheses based on rewards for size and
variables. Dyl employs ownership concentration, assets, return on equity, and industry dummies as
independent variables. He also tested several demographic variables relating to CEOs, but none
significantly added explanatory power to his model. Note that similar results for demographic factors
are found in Deckop (1987).
9The results reported in the following tables were largely robust to alternative specifications, yet
the best fit was found for a logarithmic specification (which is also desirable in this context due to
heteroscedasticity problems; see Dyl, 1988).
performance. More rapid growth of the firm should yield greater compensation for executives,
and thus result in a positive coefficient, since growth is related to both performance and the size
hypothesis. The various ownership dummies and multiple position dummies have prior expected
relationships with executive compensation as will be explained in the discussion of the empirical
results. In addition we have other hypotheses related to a more detailed analysis of different
types of executives and different types of compensation which will be explained subsequently.
n. Data Description
In order to examine the effects of the degree of corporate control on executive
compensation we require data on the distribution of stock ownership for a wide range of
companies. Corporate Data Exchange, Inc. (CDE) has collected and published a listing of all
publicly identifiable shareholders with greater than 0.2% of the voting shares in various groups
of companies including the Fortune 500, transportation, agribusiness, banking and finance, and
energy companies. CDE also calculates the shares of the top 5, 10, 15, and 20 shareholders of
total stock outstanding. CDE collected Fortune 500 data only for one time period, December
1980. These data have been the source of corporate control information for many of the studies
of stock ownership dispersion including Santerre and Neun (1986) and Dyl (1988).
Since we are confined to 1980 ownership control data, we have collected executive pay
data for 1980 from the 1981 corporate proxy statements filed with the SEC by Fortune 500
companies. Since the CDE data included 456 companies, and proxy statements were unavailable
for 5 companies, the maximum number of companies with sufficient data is 451. The proxy
statements list earnings separately for the top five executives, and for the entire executive group
as a whole (plus the number in the group). Titles of the top group are identified, and we have
isolated for comparisons the CEO, the Chairman of the Board, the President, and a residual
category of the other executives in the top five group (i.e. vice-presidents, and so forth), even
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though the functions of these positions may vary somewhat across companies. Company
statistics were obtained from Fortune for 1978-80.
Santerre and Neun (1986) and Dyl (1988) restricted themselves to the CEO compensation
data listed in Forbes. We have also used these data in our preliminary analysis and have
obtained results similar to those obtained by Santerre and Neun and by Dyl. In particular, we
obtained a negative and significant coefficient for the concentration of ownership variable as did
the previous studies. We also included executive characteristics such as age, years with the
firm, and years as CEO, in the model, but none proved to be significantly correlated with
executive pay. Consequently, in the results presented below using the SEC executive pay data,
it is not essential to include executive characteristics, so that their exclusion should not affect
significantly estimation of the effects of agency.10
in. Empirical Results
Tables 1-4 report least squares estimates of the effect of stock ownership dispersion on
the different components of executive remuneration for different executive categories both for
the full sample, and separately for owner-managed and not owner-managed firms.11 Total
income is the sum of the three components of renumeration: salary, benefits, and contingent pay.
Salary contains basic wages and includes bonuses and directors fees. Benefits include the value
of fringe benefits such as insurance, company cars, and advisory services. Contingent pay
consists of items solely dependent on company performance such as stock options. As noted
earlier, definitions are not entirely consistent across companies. Because of space constraints
we only report the coefficient estimates and standard errors of the two independent variables
10Since personal data on the executives is only available for the CEOs, we have elected not to
include these factors so as to allow us to make more uniform comparisons across the various types
of executives.
11
 Appendix table Al defines the variables used in the analysis.
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most important for the central thesis of the paper. The results for other coefficients are
summarized below and the complete estimates are available from the authors on request. Table
5 reports the estimated dollar magnitudes of the agency effects based on the estimates in Tables
1-4.
The effects of agency on total executive remuneration can be found in the coefficient of
LTOP5 in each equation (1) for the different executive groups in Table 1. The greater is the
percentage of stock held by the five largest stockholders, the lower is total executive pay
(INCOME) across the executive hierarchy.12 The results are statistically significant at the 1%
level for the Chairman of the Board, at the 5% level for the President and other executives in
the top five pay groups, and at the 10% level for the CEO. Though the coefficient has the
expected negative sign for the average of the remaining executives,13 it is not statistically
significant. The strongest results are seen for SALARY, Table 2, where the agency effect is
statistically significant for all categories of executives at the 5% level. The sign of the
coefficient is negative for all categories of executives in Table 3 for benefits, but is only
statistically significant for the Chairman of the Board. The weakest results are found for
contingency pay in Table 4, where while the signs are negative for all five executive groups,
none is statistically significant. As noted earlier, these last two measures may be less desirable
ways, in the eyes of executives, to get their "discretionary pay" since although they may have
tax advantages, they are less liquid and riskier. In addition, the classification of remuneration
into these categories varies across companies.
12This result is robust for alternative measures of ownership concentration such as percentage
held by the ten largest stockholders, although the magnitude of the effects differ. The same is true
for Tables 2-4.
13The OTHER group is calculated by subtracting the sum of the pay for the top five executives
from the pay reported in the corporate proxies for the entire executive group. This value is then
divided by the number of executives in the company, minus five, to get the average pay for an
executive who is not one of the top five paid executives in the company.
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In order to examine the effects of owner-managed status on executive pay, the variable
CL (a dummy variable indicating whether any of the top five managers is also one of the top
five stockholders) is included in panel (A) in Tables 1-4. As expected, the effect of owner
control is generally to reduce executive pay; for total remuneration we find negative effects for
all executive groups and significantly negative coefficients for four out of five of the groups,
although most coefficients are statistically insignificant for the other remuneration categories.
In order to investigate the effect of owner control on the agency effect (as opposed to the level
of pay per se - shown by the coefficients on CL), we divide the sample into owner-controlled
and not owner-controlled sub-samples for all categories of executives and remuneration. The
results of the estimation are reported in panels (B) and (C) of Tables 1-4. As expected, the
agency effect is most clearly observed in the firms that are not owner-controlled (significant
effects for not owner-controlled companies, are found in three categories for total income and
in all categories for salary). Yet, contrary to the predictions of Santerre and Neun, we find a
statistically significant agency effect in owner-managed firm for the Chairman of the Board (for
total income and salary).
In appendix Tables A2-A5 we employ a different measure of owner control, EL, which
indicates whether the manager in question is one of the five top stockholders. A firm is now
considered owner-controlled, say for the CEO, only if the CEO is also a major stockholder,
while previously the firm would be classified as owner controlled if any top five executive was
a major stockholder. We find similar agency effects with this model specification. We also find
widely different effects across the different executive groups. Apparently the executive is taking
advantage of the influence resulting from his control of a large block of stock combined with
his office, to increase his compensation when stockholding is relatively disperse.14
14Since his pay is only a small part of total company costs, his behavior is unlikely to adversely
impact on the value of his stock.
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Most of the coefficients of the other variables in the regression estimates had the expected
signs and were statistically significant in many cases (full results available on request). In
general we find that executives tend to receive higher pay when rates of return are higher, when
companies are larger (as measured in several alternative ways), and are growing faster. Family
and institutional holdings of large blocks of stock sometimes have significant effects on different
types of executives and different elements of the compensation package. Though there appears
to be little effect on personal benefits or contingency pay, large holdings by a family concern
seems to exert a generally positive influence on executive pay, possibly reflecting a founding
father effect that is not directly captured in any of the other explanatory variables.15 Dummy
variables for individuals holding multiple executive positions usually had positive coefficients
and frequently were statistically significant indicating that multiple positions lead to higher
financial remuneration.
Finally it has been asserted that greater risk will require greater rewards to executives
as a compensatory differential (both for the greater risk attached to their contingent pay per se,
and for any inherent adverse aspect of the work environment in a riskier setting). To the extent
that riskier companies are more dispersely held (since investors may not wish to hold large
blocks of riskier stocks), then it is possible that the negative coefficient on LT0P5 might simply
be picking up a compensating differential paid to executives working in riskier companies. In
order to test for this possibility, the model was augmented with two alternative additional
variables representing company risk. When the coefficient of variation of sales was included
as the risk measure it usually had the expected positive sign, and in most equations was
15Note in contrast that Deckop (1987) found that CEOs who were founders of the firm earned
less than internally-promoted CEOs, who in turn earned less than those recruited from outside the
firm.
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statistically significant,16 yet the other results changed little from before, and in fact, were
generally more significant. When the historical )8 of the company was used instead as the risk
measure, the coefficient was mostly positive but not statistically significant.17 Again the
coefficients of other variables did not change significantly (all results available on request).18
The differential impact of agency on different levels of the executive hierarchy can be
observed in the different coefficients on LTOP5 for the different groups of executives. We first
tested whether these differences are statistically significant by merging the sample across
executive positions and then including interaction terms between LTOP5 and position dummies
in our model. The individual significance of the interactions of position and LT0P5 are tested
using a t test, and the joint significance of the interactions using an F test. We obtained five sets
of results from treating each of the five executive categories as the reference group. Most of
the interaction terms are individually statistically significant at the 5% level for total income and
salary, while most are not statistically significant for benefits and contingency. The joint
interactions are always significant for total income and salary, and usually not significant for the
remaining two remuneration measures (Detailed results can be obtained from the authors). We
can conclude that the coefficients of LTOP5 are signficantly different across executive groups
for the two measures of remuneration, total income and salary, where we most consistently find
an agency effect.
16The coefficient was negative and statistically significant only for the other executives in the case
of contingencies. It was negative for three executive types under contingencies. This may indicate
that executives desire less contingency pay in riskier situations.
17Three categories of executives had significant positive coefficients with benefits. Once again
generally negative coefficients (in two cases statistically significant) appeared with contingencies.
"Similar considerations might apply to the widely observed positive relationship between
company size and executive pay since stock dispersion is greater in larger companies - a regression
of LTOP5 on In (size), with the same vector of controls used in Tables 1-4, yielded a negative
coefficient which was significant at 1% (full results available on request). Yet, since the size effect
on pay remained significant even when LTOP5 was included indicates that size is not simply
reflecting an agency effect on pay.
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Looking at the comparative elasticities for INCOME, we see that the agency effect for
the Chairman of the Board is nearly twice that for the CEO and the President, and approximately
three times the size of the effect for the other top five executives and the other executives. A
similar pattern of results is observed for SALARY. For BENEFITS the Chairman of the Board
exhibits by far the largest effect, while for contingency payments (CONTING) the Chairman and
CEO experience similar agency effects. These differential parameter estimates support our claim
that the use of CEO data to proxy the overall effects of agency on executive pay is not an
acceptable practice.
Table 5 reports our calculated estimates of the agency costs stemming from lack of
corporate control. Since the coefficients of the ownership dispersion variable are elasticities,
we can easily calculate the effects of changes in ownership dispersion. The entries for each
sample in the table are the dollar agency costs of a 10% decrease (Part A) or a 50% decrease
(Part B) in ownership concentration for the different types of executives and for each
remuneration category (using the elasticity estimates in Tables 1-4); blanks indicate no agency
costs (when the coefficients are positive). We see that the agency costs are generally largest for
the salary component of remuneration, as expected. While our estimates in Tables 1-4 indicate
that agency effects are present, the total agency cost does not appear to be a large number when
there is a relatively small change in ownership concentration such as 10%.19 For the Chairman
of the Board, the executive with the greatest sensitivity to ownership dispersion changes, a 10%
decrease in ownership concentration would only lead to an increase in compensation of $10,689,
which is small relative to any measure of company size. A massive change in ownership
concentration, such as a 50% decrease, would lead to a $53,445 increase in the CBs
compensation, which would clearly affect these executives significantly. However, this is still
only approximately a 9.0% increase in executive compensation and an insignificant figure when
19This, of course, is as expected given the relatively small values of the estimated elasticities.
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compared to average size company aggregates.20 The changes are substantially smaller for
other top executives.
IV. Conclusions
The costs to society of opportunistic behavior by managers, due to the separation of
ownership from control in the modern corporation, are potentially of great concern. These costs
include both the direct diversion of resources from owner to managers, with possible
repercussions in the capital and labor markets, and the effects on productivity, with obvious
implications for international competitiveness and general efficiency in the utilization of scarce
resources. This study focuses on one important dimension along which agency effects might
operate, namely executive remuneration.
A priori one might not expect to find agency effects manifested in executive pay since
this form of opportunistic behavior is highly visible. Rather, one might expect that managers
increase their utility by extracting resources from the owners of the corporation in a less visible
fashion, say through expense accounts, congenial employees, and so forth. Nevertheless, to the
extent that these forms of remuneration are imperfectly substitutable with direct pecuniary forms
of compensation, it is plausible that executives may attempt to exploit the lack of owner control
by taking some of their "discretionary compensation" in the more liquid form of pecuniary pay,
even though the magnitude of this effect may be small.
Our results indicate that there is a significant agency effect on executive pay, though the
total magnitude of the effect appears to be small, relative to company assets. We also find that
the effects are greatest for the most liquid form of pecuniary remuneration, salaries, and that the
20Dyl (1988) has calculated considerably larger agency costs, yet his figures are based on a
comparison of completely "atomistic" stockholding to the mean level of concentration - a much larger
change in concentration than that considered here. Our elasticities are also much smaller than those
calculated by Dyl from his semilog earnings specification (earnings are entered in a linear fashion).
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effects are nonuniform across the executive hierarchy with the strongest effect found for the
Chairman of the Board. This latter result strongly calls into question the practice by previous
researchers of using CEO data to proxy the effects of agency on the entire executive group. We
also find that agency effects differ significantly between owner-managed and not owner-managed
firms, and that these differential effects vary by whether owner-controlled is defined by the
executive in question or by any executive holding a major block of stock.
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TABLE 1: Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration












































































































NOTE: Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Superscripts a,b and c
denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Regressions are reported separately, reading
left to right, for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Chairman of the Board (CB), the President
(PRES), other executives in the top five pay group (OEXEC), and the average for the remaining
executives (OTHER). Each regression additionally includes all controls listed in the appendix table (full
results are available on request); each column includes the relevant joint position dummies (e.g. CEO
includes CEOCB, CEOPRES and CEOTH).
n = number of observations
$ value = average compensation
LTOP5 = log of the percentage of stock held by the top five stockholders
CL = dummy variable (= 1) if any of the top five managers is also one of the top five stockholders
TABLE 2: Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration






































































0.345 0.256 0.383 0.350 0.378

































See NOTE to TABLE 1.
TABLE 3: Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration








































0.108 0.093 0.086 0.058 0.128


































































See NOTE to TABLE 1.
TABLE 4: Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration









































0.129 0.124 0.106 0.102 0.106


































































See NOTE to TABLE 1.
TABLE 5: Estimated Agency Costs
Total Income Salary Benefits Contingency Pay
(1) Full Sample




































































































































NOTE: For each remuneration category, we report the dollar estimates for a 10% (Panel A) and 50% (Panel B)
decrease in the percentage of stock held by the top five stockholders. Blanks indicate a positive coefficient, yet none
of these effects was significant. An * indicates that the effect was insignificant.
APPENDIX: Table Al - Variable Definitions, Descriptive Statistics, and Data Sources
Variable Definition
TOP5 (X) Percentage of stock held by the top five 28.75
stockholders (Source: CDE); LTOP5=ln(TOP5) (16.78)
P Net Income as a Percentage of Stockholder Equity (1980) 26.34
(Source: Fortune, May 1981) (32.45)
S The total number of people employed in 1980 34,272.83
(Source: Fortune, May 1981); LEMP80=ln(EMP80) (56,548.71)
G Average growth (percentage) in sales, 17.85
1978 to 1980 (Source: Fortune) (17.54)
CL Dummy = 1 if any of the top five managers is also one 0.29
of the top five stockholders (Source: CDE) (0.46)
EL Dummy = 1 if any of the managers in question is also one 0.08
of the top five stockholders (Source: CDE) (0.27)
CEO Dummy = 1 if the respondent is the Chief Executive Officer 0.14
(Source: SEC, Corporate Proxy Statements)
CB Dummy = 1 if the respondent is the Chairman 0.18
of the Board (Source: SEC, C.P.S.)
PRES Dummy = 1 if the respondent is the President (SEC) 0.17
OEXEC Dummy = 1 if the respondent is in the top five group, 0.66
but is neither the CEO, CB, or PRES (SEC)
CEOCB Dummy = 1 if CEO and CB (Source: CDE) 0.10
CEOPRES Dummy = 1 if CEO and PRES (CDE) 0.03
CEOTH Dummy = 1 if CEO and any other executive title (CDE) 0.002
CBPRES Dummy =1 if CB and PRES (CDE) 0.001
CBOTH Dummy = 1 if CB and any other executive title (CDE) 0.007
PRESOTH Dummy = 1 if PRES and any other executive title (CDE) 0.056
FAM5 Dummy = 1 if a family interest is a major stockholder (CDE) 0.54
COM5 Dummy = 1 if a company is a major stockholder (CDE) 0.65
FIN5 Dummy = 1 if a financial co. is a major stockholder (CDE) 0.97
NOTE: Means are reported with select standard deviations in parentheses.
Data sources are listed in parentheses after the variable definitions.
TABLE A2: Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration





























R2 0.426 0.348 0.320 0.329
(B) Owner Controlled Firm (EL=1)
CEO CB PRES OEXEC
(n=41) (n=76) (n=32) (n=36)
($476,489) ($478,741) ($452,609) ($297,107)
LTOP5 -0.309b -0.254b -0.550b 0.085
(0.132) (0.119) (0.208) (0.156)
R2 0.482 0.194 0.516 0.545
(C) Not Owner Controlled Firm (EL=0)
CEO CB PRES OEXEC
(n=195) (n=229) (n=262) (n=792)
($612,146) ($627,152) ($466,514) ($304,462)
LTOP5 -0.021 -0.144b -0.083 -0.072a
(0.054) (0.058) (0.053) (0.025)
R2 0.423 0.381 0.330 0.325
NOTE: Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Superscripts a,b and c
denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Regressions are reported separately, reading
left to right, for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Chairman of the Board (CB), the President
(PRES), and other executives in the top five pay group (OEXEC). Each regression additionally includes
all controls listed in the appendix table (full results are available on request); each column includes the
relevant joint position dummies (e.g. CEO includes CEOCB, CEOPRES and CEOTH).
n = number of observations
$ value = average compensation
LTOP5 = log of the percentage of stock held by the top five stockholders
EL = dummy variable (= 1) if any of the managers in question is also one of the top five stockholders
TABLE A3; Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration
























































R2 0.371 0.198 0.467 0.480
(C) Not Owner Controlled Firm (EL=0)
CEO CB PRES OEXEC
(n=243) (n=289) (n=329) (n= 1,366)
($457,823) ($458,825) ($361,486) ($227,222)
LTOP5 -0.034 -0.137* -0.077c -0.067*
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.020)
R2 0.398 0.455 0.339 0.361
See NOTE to TABLE A2.
TABLE A4: Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration





























0.107 0.093 0.083 0.058
(B) Owner Controlled Firm (EL=D
CEO CB PRES OEXEC
(n=41) (n=70) (n=34) (n=36)
($32,236) ($45,655) ($44,851) ($18,709)
LTOP5 -0.388 -0.548 -0.691 -0.462
(0.382) (0.351) (0.788) (0.680)
R2 0.261 0.198 0.127 0.341
(C) Not Owner Controlled Firm (EL=0)
CEO CB PRES OEXEC
(n=208) (n=242) (n=269) (n=
($54,525) ($61,115) ($45,262) ($24,458)
LTOP5 0.023 -0.280 -0.007 -0.024
(0.233) (0.227) (0.199) (0.091)
R2 0.166 0.106 0.089 0.054
See NOTE to TABLE A2.
TABLE A5: Stock Dispersion Effects on Executive Remuneration





























R2 0.127 0.129 0.109 0.104
(B) Owner Controlled Firm (EL=1)
CEO CB PRES OEXEC
(n=27) (n=45) (n=15) (n=23)
($88,038) ($106,493) ($82,183) ($54,622)
LTOP5 -0.168b -0.443 -4.676a 0.248
(0.727) (0.538) (0.943) (0.693)
R2 0.326 0.146 0.935 0.613
(C) Not Owner Controlled Firm (EL=0)
CEO CB PRES OEXEC
(n=167) (n=189) (n=204) (n=834)
($116,720) ($123,191) ($90,885) ($49,002)
LTOP5 -0.166 -0.269 -0.167 -0.170c
(0.234) (0.219) (0.203) (0.097)
R2 0.118 0.122 0.120 0.101
See NOTE to TABLE A2.
